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Abstract: In this paper we claim that, in the WTO Appellate Body (AB)’s ruling
in US‒Countervailing Measures (China), the AB decision has not put in question
the practice of imposing countervailing duties (CVDs). While the US has formally
‘lost’ the case, a change in the procedures and tests used to motivate the CVD
will allow the US to continue using this policy tool on the speciﬁed products.
From an economic point of view, this is not welcome news since CVDs have the
standard distortionary effects of tariffs and could go against environmental goals.
From a political-economy point of view, the CVDs in this case appear driven by
pressure of domestic manufacturers of clean energy technology and products.

1. Introduction
In theory, cheaper and more widely available environmental goods (products such
as wind turbines that facilitate the transition to sources of energy that have lower
greenhouse gas emissions) are a positive development. The international community is facing a climate crisis, and the widespread adoption of cleaner energy
sources is generally regarded as a primary and essential element of addressing
this crisis. Government subsidies for environmental goods, at ﬁrst sight, would
seem to be a welcome policy choice. They address the issue that the social costs
of high carbon energy sources are higher than the private costs. By facilitating
the switch to lower carbon energy sources, subsidies of clean energy promote the
goal of pollution reduction (given a context characterized by lack of appropriate
carbon taxes due to political infeasibility of such taxes in major economies).
The international response to subsidies, however, has been anything but encouraging thus far. The United States (US), the European Union (EU), and China are
arguably in a trade war over government support for environmental goods, including solar panels, wind turbines, and biofuels. In particular, the EU is imposing exceptionally large antidumping duties (ADs) and countervailing duties (CVDs) on
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Chinese environmental goods and US biodiesel. The US is imposing large ADs and
CVDs on Chinese environmental goods. Also, China is imposing CVDs on the US,
EU, and South Korean environmental goods (Kasteng, 2013; Lewis, 2014b). This
tit-for-tat application of domestic trade remedies on environmental goods has
raised domestic prices for consumers in major markets, and potentially chilled investment by making the future market for these goods uncertain.
States are making some multilateral efforts to liberalize trade in environmental
goods by lowering bound MFN tariff rates through the WTO and ASEAN, but
these efforts are not gaining traction. States have not even been able to reach a consensus on the deﬁnition of environmental goods, and there seems to be little political support to push forward quickly. Moreover, none of the existing draft
agreements exempts environmental goods from domestic trade remedies (AD/
CVDs/safeguards), which can have a much bigger impact than the MFN tariff
rate on the retail prices of these goods. Finally, although the Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement used to have a carve-out for environmental goods, there also appears to be no political will to revive it.
Because of the political difﬁculties in making progress on a new agreement, commentators have frequently looked to the WTO Appellate Body (AB) to craft trade
law decisions that would have the effect of liberalizing the trade in environmental
goods (Cosbey and Mavroidis, 2014). This includes calls for the AB to provide
wide ﬂexibility for states to adopt a pro-environmental policy under GATT
Article XX and under the SCM agreement (Howse, 2013). In addition, there has
been some hope that the AB would restrict the conditions under which WTO
members could apply domestic trade remedies to environmental goods (Wu and
Salzman, 2013).
Against this background, we analyze the present AB decision, US–
Countervailing Measures (China).1 This case addresses the US application of countervailing duties (CVDs) on a number of products, two of which are environmental
products (solar panels and wind turbines). We focus our analysis on these goods,
although the AB does not discuss CVDs on these two goods any differently than
any of the other challenged goods.
We argue that: (1) although China ‘won’ this case, the AB decision did not meaningfully restrict the application of CVDs to environmental goods in future cases; (2)
from an economic viewpoint, this is likely to be welfare-reducing to the extent that
the reduction in international prices due to these policies is not strong enough to
compensate for the increase in domestic prices and for the domestic distortions
of the CVD; (3) that to make any real progress on more liberalized trade in environmental goods, we need to move away from a reliance on the AB and focus on
gaining political support for a new agreement.

1 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from
China, WT/DS437/AB/R, adopted 16 January 2015.
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2. The legal perspective

2.1 The Appellate Body’s ruling
The AB decision in this case addressed the United States Department of
Commerce’s (USDOC) application of CVDs on 17 products from China. The
primary issue that the AB resolved concerned the investigating authority’s
(the USDOC) creation of a benchmark to evaluate the producer’s beneﬁt from
the alleged Chinese government subsidy. The SCM Agreement requires both
that the government offers a subsidy and that domestic ﬁrms receive a beneﬁt
from the subsidy for an importing state to impose a CVD (SCM Article 1.1). The
importing country can impose a duty only up to the point that the foreign government subsidy provided the exporting ﬁrm with a beneﬁt (SCM Article 14(d)).
This appeal addresses the methodology by which an investigating authority can
determine the benchmark for evaluating the beneﬁt of the government subsidy.
Speciﬁcally, this dispute between the US and China concerns how the US (the investigative authority) calculates the level of beneﬁt from a ﬁrm’s receipt of belowmarket-price inputs from the Chinese government (the subsidizing government).
When a government provides a subsidy through below-market-price inputs, the
value of the subsidy is not directly transparent (as a cash subsidy or tax credit
would be). The value of the subsidy is determined by reference to the market
value of the good (SCM Article 14(d)). The dispute in this case concerned how
an investigating state can determine what the ‘market benchmark’ is for calculating the ﬁrm’s beneﬁt from the subsidy. The AB cut a middle ground between the
two member states’ arguments, determining that US procedures are inconsistent
with the SCM Agreement, but also rejecting China’s argument that the activities
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that are not acting as public bodies can never be
relevant to the choice of the market benchmark.
The critical issue in this case hinged on the US measurement of the Chinese ﬁrms’
beneﬁt from the government subsidy. The SCM Agreement requires investigative
authorities (the government applying the CVD) to perform a ‘subsidy-offered’ analysis and a ‘beneﬁt-received’ analysis as part of its CVD regulatory process. The
SCM Agreement is symmetrical in that the subsidy that the government offers
and the beneﬁt that the ﬁrm receives must be opposite sides of the same transaction.
This requirement becomes an important point for the present Appellate Body decision. The level of beneﬁt that the ﬁrm receives must be tied to the government
subsidy (rather than any advantage that the ﬁrm receives from sources other
than the government). In the ﬁrst analysis, the panel looks to see if the government
offers a subsidy. The subsidy can come from any number of sources, including government guaranteed loans (lowering the interest rate to the ﬁrm and costing the
government nothing if the ﬁrm repays the loan), tax credits, direct payments, the
supply of inputs at below-market prices, or the purchase of the producer’s goods
at above-market prices. The beneﬁt to the ﬁrm may be greater than the cost to
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the government of offering the subsidy (for instance, government guaranteed loans
that the ﬁrm repays) or less than the cost to the government (for instance, direct
subsidies that require the use of more expensive local products). The beneﬁt to
the ﬁrm must come only from the government subsidy, although the cost to the government of offering the subsidy does not need to match the ﬁrm’s beneﬁt.
China’s argument was that the US’s CVD procedures were decoupling the ﬁrm’s
beneﬁt from the government subsidy from the CVD rate, and that the US’s beneﬁt
methodology was setting a CVD rate that effectively included actions by the
Chinese government and by SOEs that were not public bodies (the latter cannot
give a subsidy under CVD rules). China’s argument began by pointing out that
past AB decisions have highlighted that ‘government’ subsidies can only come
from the government directly or from public bodies – that is, organizations controlled by the government that provide a public function. SOEs can be, but are
not necessarily, public bodies. The analysis of whether an SOE is a public body
does not depend on the level of ﬁnancial support the SOE offers to a ﬁrm or industry, but rather on whether the SOE is performing a ‘government function’ – that is,
providing support that is part of the government’s sovereign function. An SOE can
be government-controlled – meaning the government can own a majority or controlling share of the company – and yet not be a public body because it does not
perform any government functions (and thus should be treated like a private ﬁrm
for CVD purposes).
The speciﬁc procedure that China challenged was the US’s rejection of Chinese
domestic prices for determining the value of the subsidy – inputs from the government that were sold to the ﬁrms at below market prices. Article 14(d) requires that
calculation of a ﬁrm’s beneﬁt from the input supplied by the government be determined by comparing the price of the government-supplied input to the prevailing
market price.2 China and the US disagreed about when the investigative authority
could reject ‘in-country’ prices (domestic Chinese prices) as the market benchmark
to determine the level of the ﬁrm’s beneﬁt.
The benchmark is important because it establishes the level of beneﬁt that the
ﬁrm enjoyed by receiving below-market-price inputs from the government. For instance, if the domestic Chinese price for Widget A is $10 and the price of the government supplied Widget A is $6, then the beneﬁt to the ﬁrm from the subsidy is $4.
The maximum CVD per good that the investigative authority could then impose
would also be $4 (as this is the extent of the ﬁrm’s beneﬁt). If the investigating authority rejects the in-country price because the market is distorted (and thus cannot

2 Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement states ‘the provision of goods or services or purchase of goods by
a government shall not be considered as conferring a beneﬁt unless the provision is made for less than adequate remuneration, or the purchase is made for more than adequate remuneration. The adequacy of remuneration shall be determined in relation to prevailing market conditions for the good or service in
question in the country of provision or purchase (including price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale)’.
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establish a market price based on supply and demand), then the benchmark can be
much higher. For instance, if the investigating authority selects State B as a the relevant country to supply the benchmark (because there is a market price there) and
the State B’s price for Widget A is $14, then the beneﬁt that the ﬁrm receives from
the subsidy jumps 100% to $8. Similarly, the maximum CVD that the investigating
authority can now impose increases to $8 per good. Higher CVDs are adverse for
exporting ﬁrms, but advantageous to import-competing ﬁrms in the investigating
state (although ﬁrms in the investigating state that use the foreign good as an
input are disadvantaged).
China next argued that the US procedures are de facto decoupling the government subsidy from the CVD rate because the US government was treating the
actions of SOEs that were not public bodies as relevant to the benchmark. To
make this next step, the Chinese government observed that the US government
had rejected in-country prices for inputs because the US alleged that Chinese
SOEs were distorting the domestic market and thus making it impossible for the
US to formulate a Chinese ‘market price’ based on supply and demand. As such,
the US rejected in-country Chinese prices and established a benchmark based on
out-of-country prices. The US justiﬁed this decision because it claimed that only
out-of-country prices could establish a ‘market price’ for the government-supplied
input. The Chinese government highlighted that the actions of non-public-body
SOEs (not government subsidies) were responsible for the difference between incountry prices and the out-of-country prices.
To make this (hopefully) clearer, consider the example of the USDOC’s CVD investigation regarding Chinese inputs of polysilicon in solar panels. In that investigation, the USDOC simply noted that China had an ownership or management
interest in 37 of the 47 producers of polysilicon in China. A government ownership
interest does not turn a producer into a public body capable of providing a subsidy.
Nonetheless, a high proportion of SOEs in a speciﬁc market can be sufﬁcient to
reject in-country prices as non-market based. The USDOC did reject in-country
prices in this instance, stating, ‘we determine that the GOC [Government of
China] is the predominant provider of polysilicon in the PRC and that its signiﬁcant
presence in the market distorts all transaction prices’ (para. 4.94).
This rejection of in-country prices can have the same functional effect (in terms of
CVD rates) as treating non-public-body SOEs as public SOEs providing a subsidy.
Where a non-public-body SOE market presence leads an investigating authority to
reject in-country prices and adopt higher out-of-country prices, then that difference
in country prices is functionally the same as a subsidy in terms of the CVD rate. For
instance, if the unit price of polysilicon is $10 in China and $14 in the out-ofcountry price, the CVD rate can be $4 per unit higher if out-of-country prices
are used (just as if the Chinese government gave a $4 per unit subsidy). Here the
CVD rate increases by $4 notwithstanding the fact that the non-public SOEs
cannot provide a subsidy under SCM rules. China argued that this US practice
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was inconsistent with the SCM Agreement because it violated the symmetry of the
government offered subsidy being the source of the ﬁrm’s beneﬁt.
In less technical terms, the Chinese argument is essentially this: the US can only
count government or public body support as a subsidy to the ﬁrm in either the ‘government offered’ or the ‘beneﬁt received’ analysis. The US knows that it cannot
count any support from non-public body SOEs through the front door, so it is
counting non-public body SOEs’ support through the back door. That back
door is the out-of-country price benchmark. Thus, China argued that the AB
should require the US to use in-country prices as its beneﬁt benchmark (and
thereby disallowing the US practice of counting non-public body SOEs’ actions
in the market in the ‘beneﬁt-received’ analysis). The Chinese government made
this argument textually by maintaining that there could not be two different deﬁnitions of the word ‘government’. China maintained that the SCM agreement could
have only one deﬁnition of the term ‘government’ and thus the actions of nonpublic body SOEs should not enter into the benchmark analysis (paras. 4.37–4.39).
The US rejects this position, arguing that it was entitled to use out-of-country
prices when there was not a domestic market to establish a market price based
on supply and demand. Because the Chinese market was distorted by the predominant presence of SOEs, in-country prices would be artiﬁcially below true market
prices. As a result, the US claimed that the only accurate way to value the ﬁrms’
beneﬁt from the government subsidy was to adopt out-of-country prices. The
US’s position was not that it was entitled to count non-public-body SOEs’ activity
as contributing to the subsidy, but rather that the only means of accurately determining the true value of the subsidy was to look to markets that were not distorted
by SOEs’ activity. Thus, the US claim was an evidentiary one – that the only good
evidence of true market prices existed outside of the Chinese market, and thus it
could reject in-country prices – not a substantive claim that the US was justiﬁed
in including non-public-body SOEs’ activity into the beneﬁt analysis.
Importantly, however, the US adopted a standard that presumed the Chinese
market was distorted whenever the government or SOEs were the predominant
provider of the input.
The AB forged a middle ground, rejecting China’s argument that the US could
never use out-of-country prices to establish a market benchmark, but also rejecting
the US’s SOE market presence approach by demonstrating that Chinese prices were
in fact distorted. The AB began by accepting China’s argument that there is only
one deﬁnition of the word ‘government’ in the SCM Agreement (para. 4.42), but
rejecting the idea that this meant that activities of non-public-body SOEs could
not be relevant to the beneﬁt benchmark. As the AB put it, ‘China’s argument
that there is a single standard for deﬁning the term “government” does not
answer the question of whether the prices of goods provided by private or government-related entities in the country of provision are to be considered as market
determined for purposes of selecting a beneﬁt benchmark’ (para. 4.43). The AB
recounted how previous AB decisions explicitly allowed an investigating authority
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to reject in-country prices if there was not a domestic ‘market’ price because the
market was distorted by government subsidies. Particularly in US–Carbon Steel
(India)3 and US–Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China),4 prior AB
rulings established that investigating authorities could reject in-country prices
(and thus shift to an out-of-country price benchmark) when government activity
in the domestic market had distorted prices. Citing US–Carbon Steel (India), the
AB noted that it ‘would not be appropriate’ to use in-country prices when the government has used its market power to lower private prices of the input because ‘this
would lead to a calculation of beneﬁt that is artiﬁcially low, or even zero, [thus] the
right of Members to countervail subsidies could be undermined or circumvented in
such a scenario’ (para. 4.50).
Having established that investigating authorities could in theory reject incountry prices in the beneﬁts analysis, the AB then raised the evidentiary bar for
allowing them to do so. The AB emphasized that the link between government predominance in the market and price distortion was one that the investigating authority had to actually demonstrate before turning to out-of-country prices. The AB
‘clariﬁed’ its decision in US–Softwood Lumber IV5 by repudiating the idea that
an investigating authority could adopt a per se rule that domestic prices were distorted anytime that a government was the predominant supplier in the market
(para. 4.52). The AB further found that the USDOC had not adequately demonstrated that such a link existed in the CVD investigations of this issue because
the USDOC had adopted a per se rule that government predominance could be
equated to market distortion (para. 4.80). To be consistent with the SCM
Agreement, the USDOC would have to perform a case-by-case analysis of
whether the subsidizing state’s domestic market was distorted by government
action (by either public bodies or non-public body SOEs). The USDOC would additionally have to offer an adequate explanation of its methodology and how its
determined markets were, in fact, distorted (para. 4.84). In short, the AB found
that the US could not just assume that there was not a ‘real’ market in China
simply because of the presence of SOEs.

2.2 Analysis of the ruling for future CVD cases
This decision continued the AB’s attempt to put limits on states’ use of CVDs while
accepting that members were entitled under the WTO Agreements to use CVDs
under certain conditions. Indeed, the AB stated in its reasoning that it did not

3 Appellate Body Report, United States ‒ Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel
Flat Products from India, WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted 19 December 2014, paras. 4.45–4.54, 4.65.
4 Appellate Body Report, United States ‒ Deﬁnitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on
Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 25 March 2011.
5 Appellate Body Report, United States – Investigation of the International Trade Commission in
Softwood Lumber from Canada – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada, WT/DS277/AB/RW,
adopted 9 May 2006
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want to undermine or circumvent the ‘right’ of members to apply CVDs even to
environmental goods (para. 4.50). The current decision did not go particularly
far in restricting investigating authorities from using out-of-country prices in establishing a beneﬁt benchmark. The AB did not put any substantive limits on the
benchmark analysis. In rejecting China’s position, the AB endorsed the idea that
high out-of-country price benchmarks were more appropriate even when the incountry prices were inﬂuenced by non-public-body SOEs. The limits established
by the AB in this case were procedural. The AB imposed new process requirements
for investigating authorities before in-country prices could be rejected.
These new process requirements may end up being a rather loose binding on an
investigating authority for several reasons. First, a big question going forward is
how closely the WTO panels or AB are going to scrutinize a USDOC decision
that the Chinese market is distorted by SOE activity. The AB seemed to show its
hand that it would be sympathetic to ﬁndings of distortion when there is a large
government presence in the market when the AB noted that ‘[a]lthough a government’s predominance in the market makes it likely that prices will be distorted, the
distortion of in-country prices must be established on the basis of the particular
facts underlying each countervailing duty investigation’ (para. 4.51, emphasis
added). Such a statement does not indicate that panels should give a hard look
to an investigating state’s determination that in-country prices are distorted.
Rather, it indicates a fair level of deference to investigating authority’s ﬁndings
so long as they perform a case-by-case analysis.
Second, the AB essentially lays out a ‘WTO-compliance action plan’ for a CVD
application that does not require much real change. Even though the AB completed
the legal analysis in four of the CVD cases and found that the USDOC had erroneously rejected in-country prices for the beneﬁt benchmark, the AB failed to say that
the USDOC could not continue to reject in-country prices in future cases against the
same products. For instance, in the solar panels CVD case, the AB determined that
the USDOC had incorrectly rejected in-country prices because it ‘did not explain
whether and how the relevant 37 producers possessed and exerted market power
such that other in-country prices were distorted’ (para. 4.96). However, the AB’s
previous statement that government market predominance makes distortion
‘likely’ indicates that it would be receptive to a USDOC ﬁnding of price distortion
(37 out of 47 ﬁrms were SOEs) if the USDOC had provided a case-speciﬁc analysis
of how the market was distorted. The USDOC simply needs to clean up its procedures – by doing the case-by-case analysis – and it can effectively maintain its
current policies. This case may be analogous to the US ‘loss’ in United States ‒
Shrimp6 where the AB found the US measures to be inconsistent with GATT
rules. However, the AB effectively set out a path to compliance that is relatively

6 Appellate Body Report, United States ‒ Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998.
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easy for the US to meet. If the US made only modest changes to its policies, it might
then be able to receive WTO approval for its policies through the DSU Article 21.5
compliance process. Thus, while the US ‘lost’ this case in the sense that the AB
found the USDOC’s rule to be inconsistent with the SCM Agreement, the effect
of this ruling may give Chinese exporters little comfort.7
The US may be more constrained in future cases by the panel’s decision that the
US erred by presuming that inputs provided by SOEs were government subsidies
for the SCM 1.1(a) government contribution analysis. The panel found that the
USDOC needed to provide an analysis of whether the SOEs were performing a government function. If not, then the SOEs would not be public bodies and any contribution from these entities would not be government contributions under the
SCM Agreement. The US did not appeal this ﬁnding and thus the issue was not
included in our review of the AB’s decision. Nonetheless, this issue may prove to
be more of a substantive constraint on the investigating authority in future cases
if the AB establishes a narrow scope for government functions.

2.3 The (un)importance of benchmarks for environmental goods
For all of the previous analyses of benchmarks and SOEs’ activity, the importance
of the AB’s review of the CVD process (and all trade remedy processes) may be
pretty minimal for liberalizing trade in environmental goods. Member states can
play the system by applying these duties and then removing them after the WTO
dispute resolution process ﬁnds them inconsistent with trade rules. Member
states do not face any penalties for these actions and they do not even have to
refund the past years’ duties. Particularly in environmental goods, where technological change is rapid, the WTO’s slow pace has difﬁculty providing meaningful
protection to these goods through the DSU’s review of members’ CVD investigations. As a result, some broader (probably non-judicial) approach is needed to liberalize trade in this area.
The application of CVDs (as well as anti-dumping duties) is essentially a unilateral state process with WTO oversight of the outcomes. This means that member
states can impose CVD/AD duties, wait to see if another state will take the case
to the WTO, and then wait until the WTO review is complete before altering
any of the duties. So long as the member state complies at the end of the WTO
dispute resolution process, the breaching member state does not have to offer
any compensation to the member injured by the breach (and does not have offer
retrospective damages even if compliance is not forthcoming) (Schwartz and
Sykes, 2002; Brewster, 2011).

7 Howse (2012) makes a similar argument regarding EU’s Aviation Emissions trading rules, noting that
‘[i]f the WTO dispute settlement organs ﬁnd in favor of the challengers because of some detailed aspect of
the application of the EU scheme that the EU could easily tweak, then they would have won the battle but
lost the war, as it were’.
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The entire process can easily take three years or more. That is four years that the
investigating authority can impose duties without any meaningful constraint by the
WTO. In the present case, China was challenging the US’s application of CVDs
imposed between 2007 and 2012. The AB opinion was issued in December
2014, and the US has a ‘reasonable period of time’ after the decision to alter its
policy. Thus, the US is able to impose duties unilaterally for three to eight years.
In a fast turnover technology sector such as solar panels, three years is effectively
the life of the product cycle (Horlick, 2013). By the time that the WTO is able to
review a nation’s CVD or AD process, the duty served its purpose and a new
duty can be applied to the next generation of environmental goods. As a result,
alternatives need to be found that bypass the CVD/AD domestic remedy process
entirely.

3. The economic perspective
In this section, we discuss the economic aspects of the WTO Appellate Body’s
ruling in US‒Countervailing Measures (China) focusing on solar panels (SPs) and
wind turbines (WTs). Subsection 3.1 presents the framework for the welfare analysis of both the subsidy imposed by China and the CVD imposed by the US government in response. The following subsections apply the framework to ﬁrst the
subsidy and then the CVD and present empirical evidence to answer the following
questions: (1) Does the instrument address a market distortion and, if so, is that instrument the ﬁrst-best tool to address the distortion? (2) Is the subsidy/CVD motivated by ‘strategic trade-policy’ goals? (3) Does the subsidy/CVD have an impact
on social welfare in the rest of the world through the ‘terms-of-trade’ channel?
(4) And could there political-economy motives behind the subsidy and CVD?

3.1 The welfare analysis framework
In order to analyze welfare effects, it is important to focus on some key aspects of
the markets considered that are related to the size and structure of each country and
to the existence of distortions. In particular, as we discuss the welfare effects, we
will need to take into account the answers to the following questions:
1. Does a market failure related to the environment exist? In particular, what kind
of externality is it associated with, a production or a consumption externality? Is
the externality local or global?
2. Are China and the US, respectively, net importers or net exporters of SPs and
WTs?
3. Are China and the US, respectively, ‘small’ or ‘large’ economies in the markets
considered?
4. Is the market structure of the SPs and WTs markets competitive or is there some
degree of market power?
5. Are the markets of SPs and WTs politically organized in China and the US?
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Figure 1. Net exports of solar panels by China (millions of USD)

Source: United Nations (2003).

We address each of these questions and provide empirical evidence (when
available).
Regarding the ﬁrst question, given the nature of the goods considered it is likely
that an environmental market failure exists and that it is global in nature. Electricity
produced from fossil fuels is associated with high levels of carbon emissions, a
negative externality which gives rise to a market failure. The private marginal
cost for producers of fossil-fuel electricity will not account for this externality,
which implies that there will be over-production of fossil-fuel electricity compared
to socially optimal levels. The reduction in carbon emissions from SPs and WTs
comes from substituting consumption of carbon-intensive electricity with consumption of clean generated electricity such as solar and wind. In addition,
carbon emissions affect all countries in the world, no matter where the generation
of carbon-intensive electricity takes places, i.e. the negative externality is global
because its effects cross borders.
To address the second question, we use data on imports and exports at the 6-digit
Harmonized System (HS) level for SPs (854140) and WTs (730820)8 to determine
whether the US and China are net exporters or importers of these products (our
data are up to 2013). China imported a very small amount of SPs from 1996
until 2007, but since 2007 it has become a net exporter of SPs. In addition,
China has been a net exporter of WTs since 1998. The US has been a net importer
of SPs throughout the period we consider (1996–2013), while it has been a net importer of WTs since 2001 (see Figures 1 through 4). In terms of production and consumption, some observers note that, until recently, almost all production of SPs and
8 The 6-digit HS code 730820 is a code for ‘towers and lattice matts’, which includes WTs but not
exclusively.
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Figure 2. Net exports of wind turbines by China (millions of USD)

Source: United Nations (2003).

Figure 3. Net exports of solar panels by the US (millions of USD)

Source: United Nations (2003).

WTs by Chinese manufacturers was exported. However, since 2010 China has
invested heavily in deploying solar capacity locally, as detailed below.
The third question, whether the US and China are ‘small’ or ‘large’ economies in
the markets of SPs and WTs, is essential to determine the terms-of-trade effect of the
welfare analysis. Following the literature (see, for example, Broda et al., 2008;
Ludema and Mayda, 2013), we can measure an importing country’s market
power in a given market with the inverse elasticity of export supply. Based on
this measure, for both WTs and SPs, the US and China are ‘large’ economies.9

9 Note that these estimates of market power are for the 1990s but it is likely that, if anything, the
market power of these two importing countries has increased in more recent years.
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Figure 4. Net exports of wind turbines by the US (millions of USD)

Source: United Nations (2003).

Figure 5. Market shares of top 10 wind turbine manufacturers, 2012

Source: REN21 – Renewables 2013 Global Status Report.

Regarding question 4, we can gather information on the structure of the markets
of SPs and WTs in China and the US, respectively, by calculating the extent of concentration of these markets across ﬁrms. One measure of concentration is the
market share of the top ﬁve ﬁrms. A market is considered oligopolistic if the top
ﬁve ﬁrms account for over 50% of the market. Figure 5 shows that the top ﬁve
wind turbine manufacturers in the world in 2012 accounted for 56% of this
market, which suggests that the world market of WTs is oligopolistic. The world
market of SPs on the other hand is competitive. In 2012, the top ﬁve producers
of solar modules accounted for just around a quarter of the market (Figure 6).
The local markets in China and the US look different though. Figure 7 shows
market shares by locally owned ﬁrms in leading domestic wind markets in the
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Figure 6. Market shares of top 15 solar PV module manufacturers, 2012

Source: REN21 – Renewables 2013 Global Status Report.

Figure 7. Market shares by locally owned ﬁrms in leading domestic wind markets,
2012

Source: Lewis (2014a).

year 2012. The US market for WTs appears more concentrated than the world
market, while the Chinese one is less. But in wind, both markets can be considered
oligopolistic. As for solar, the US market for SPs is highly oligopolistic with up to
83% of production concentrated in the top ﬁve producers (Statista, 2015), while
the Chinese market is considered highly competitive (Haley and Haley, 2013).
Therefore, outside of the Chinese and world SP industry, all relevant markets
exhibit some degree of market power.
Finally, data from Ludema and Mayda (2013) show that both HS 6-digit codes
730820 (WTs) and 854140 (SPs) are politically organized sectors in the US (political
organization is measured by the presence of business associations). Data for China
on sectors’ political organization are not available, but the fact that a WTO case
was ﬁled against the US CVD suggests some degree of political organization.

3.2 Social-welfare rationale for the Chinese subsidy on SPs and WTs
In this section, we analyze the social-welfare rationale for the Chinese subsidy from
a theoretical point of view for Chinese and rest-of-the-world (ROW) welfare. From
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the point of view of China’s social welfare, we need to explore whether the subsidy
under scrutiny was meant to address market distortions. Some distortions might be
speciﬁc to environmental goods, others may not.
As discussed above, the production of electricity from fossil fuels creates a negative externality in the form of carbon emissions, a global pollutant that affects the
whole world. To reduce global carbon emissions from electricity generation, the
ﬁrst-best tool would be a global tax on carbon. There are two reasons why subsidies are not ﬁrst best. First, subsidies tip the scale in favor of a particular technology
while a global tax on carbon allows each ﬁrm to choose its most efﬁcient abatement
option. Second, subsidies, unlike taxes, increase the proﬁtability of the industry,
which induces entry of potentially inefﬁcient ﬁrms.
Unfortunately, a global carbon tax has proven to be politically infeasible. As a
result, an alternative way to address the negative externality associated with the
production of fossil-fuel electricity is to encourage alternative forms of energy
that are clean – in particular, generating electricity using SPs and WTs does not
produce greenhouse gases. As world consumption of clean energy increases, the
world use and production of fossil fuel electricity decreases – other things held
equal – which in turn implies a reduction in the negative externality.
The most direct way to increase world consumption of SPs and WTs is to subsidize their consumption. The Chinese subsidy under scrutiny was to production, not
consumption, and it targeted Chinese as opposed to world production. However,
since China is a ‘large’ economy in these markets, the subsidy has likely decreased
the world price of SPs and WTs and thus has increased ROW consumption of these
goods, besides having increased Chinese consumption. In addition, since pollution
is global, the increase in world consumption of these goods and the associated decrease in greenhouse gas emissions gives rise to an increase in Chinese and ROW
welfare.
It is therefore possible to justify the Chinese subsidy on the grounds that it corrects an environmental market failure, although the question remains whether the
subsidy is too large or too small to optimally address the environmental problem.
The subsidy could also tackle more general market failures. Suboptimal investment levels can occur when ﬁrms cannot be fully compensated for their investment.
A ﬁrm investing in research and development might be concerned that its innovation could be imitated by competitors or have spillovers into other industries.
These failures can result in suboptimal levels of investment in SPs and WTs innovation, or in a diversion of innovative resources away from radically new technologies in favor of more incremental innovation. This failure can be exacerbated if
prices are too low to provide incentives to innovate.
Subsidies can also address an infant-industry type of market failure. In some
cases, an industry could have latent comparative advantage, which only kicks in
when a certain threshold of production is attained (i.e. economies of scale exist,
but the ﬁrms in the industry do not internalize them, which gives rise to an externality); or capital market imperfections could make it difﬁcult for young industries
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or small ﬁrms to secure funding. However, latent comparative advantage is difﬁcult
to identify ahead of time, and so there is no guarantee that the beneﬁt of protecting
an industry will outweigh the cost. Governments also suffer from information failures and could mis-time or mis-target the intervention.
The most efﬁcient subsidy would be global: it would encourage an increase in the
world use of SPs and WTs – and therefore a decrease in world use and production of
fossil fuel electricity – but would allow for the production of SPs and WTs to take
place where the comparative advantage is greatest. Instead, a local subsidy will target
production of a speciﬁc country, in this case China. If China has a comparative advantage in the production of SPs and WTs, the local subsidy is a good tool. If instead it is
welfare enhancing to produce SPs and WTs in other countries – because of factor
endowments, technology, or the carbon footprint of production and transport – the
subsidy is distorting the world allocation of production. The question is then whether
it is globally welfare enhancing for the majority of SPs and WTs to be built in China.
Thus, subsidies to SPs and WTs can be justiﬁed on the basis of various types of
market failures. However, it is important to keep in mind that subsidies should
meet two conditions (Kemp, 1960). First, the supported section should eventually
be able to survive and compete globally without the subsidy. Making sure that
ﬁrms can eventually survive without the subsidy also helps alleviate concerns
that the subsidies are distorting the allocation of productive resources towards
inefﬁcient ﬁrms. Since subsidies create rents, ﬁrms will lobby to maintain them,
even when they are no longer necessary. An agreement which would allow environmental subsidies should make sure to address how and when to remove the subsidies. Second, the total cost of support should be outweighed by the present
discounted value of beneﬁts. Costs include ﬁnancing of the subsidy through
taxes, which can create distortions. Beneﬁts include potential employment gains
from increased output as well as global environmental beneﬁts.
Beyond market failures, subsidies are sometimes given for ‘strategic trade-policy’
motives, i.e. as a way to favor Chinese ﬁrms in export markets, which are not competitive (see Brander and Spencer, 1985). This scenario is more likely if the subsidies
are targeted to exports as opposed to production. Knowing with certainty whether
the motive of the subsidy is strategic or environmental or associated with other
market failures is a difﬁcult task.
In terms of ROW welfare, since the subsidy increases world consumption of SPs
and WTs and thus decreases global pollution, it gives rise to an increase in ROW
social welfare. In addition, we need to take into account the impact of the subsidy
on international prices. Since the subsidizing country (China) is a large economy,
the increase in world supply will decrease international prices. Therefore countries
which are net importers of SPs and WTs (Table 1) will beneﬁt from the Chinese
subsidy since they will be able to import SPs and WTs for a lower price (i.e., these
countries will experience a terms-of-trade improvement). The opposite is true for
net exporting countries. In both sets of countries, domestic consumers will beneﬁt
from the reduction in prices, while domestic producers will be hurt.
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Table 1. Top importers and exporters of SPs and WTs in 2013
Solar panels

Wind turbines

Top importers

Top exporters

Top net
exporters

Top importers

Top exporters

Top net
exporters

China

China

China

United
Kingdom
Germany
Romania
Canada

Denmark

Denmark

Japan
United States
Hong Kong,
China
Germany
Korea, Rep.
Mexico

Japan
Korea, Rep.
Germany

Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore

China
Spain
Turkey

China
Turkey
Spain

Malaysia
United States
Singapore

United Kingdom

Philippines

Korea, Rep.
Sweden
Slovak
Republic
Mongolia

United States
Indonesia
Sweden

India
Germany
United States

India
Portugal
Italy

Australia

Portugal

Netherlands
Mexico

Nigeria
Brazil

Indonesia
Italy

France

Sweden

Singapore

United
Kingdom
France

Egypt, Arab
Rep.
Mexico
Czech
Republic
Vietnam

Netherlands
India
Italy

France

Italy

Kyrgyz
Republic
Morocco

Egypt, Arab
Rep.
Mexico

Thailand

Belgium

Saudi Arabia

Malaysia

Ghana

Belgium
Romania

Czech
Republic
India
Thailand

Czech
Republic
Vietnam

Australia
Ukraine
Canada

Hungary
Croatia
Austria

Ireland
Chile
Oman

Austria
Norway

Poland
Slovak
Republic
Saudi Arabia
Norway
South Africa

South Africa
Slovak
Republic
Poland
Korea, Rep.
Israel
Thailand
Latvia
El Salvador
Argentina

Source: United Nations (2003).

3.3 Empirical evidence on the impact of the Chinese subsidy on SPs and WTs
Following up on the theoretical arguments, and having previously determined that
China and the US are ‘large’ economies, we investigate whether there is any empirical evidence that the subsidy given by the Chinese government has been effective in
improving China’s social welfare and ROW social welfare. The evidence we will
provide is anecdotal and not meant to be interpreted causally.
Although a large portion of Chinese production of SPs is exported, China has
invested heavily in the domestic deployment of solar energy since 2010 and
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therefore has become an important consumer of SPs. From less than 1GW of solar
capacity in 2010, China had installed almost 30GW by 2014, pulling it to second
position worldwide after Germany. This trend is expected to continue as China installed the equivalent of France’s entire capacity in just the ﬁrst quarter of 2015. By
the end of 2015, China will have installed new capacity equivalent to more than
twice the new capacity installed in the United States in 2014.
Yet, despite record SPs installations in the past few years, manufacturing capacity far exceeded demand in China. By 2010, China was the single largest producer of SPs, supplying 45% of world production (ChinaGlobalTrade, 2012). These
high levels of SPs production have resulted in a sharp decline in prices in recent
years (IRENA, 2014). As mentioned above, the decrease in world prices of SPs
beneﬁts consumers and hurts producers, all over the world. For example, there is
evidence that the fall in prices also hurt some Chinese ﬁrms, as evidenced by a
series of bankruptcies in 2012 and 2013 (Stanford GSB, 2013). These bankruptcies
indicate that the subsidies might have been encouraging overcapacity by ﬁrms that
are not efﬁcient enough to compete in global markets.
From an environmental perspective, cheaper SPs leads to further adoption of
solar energy, and therefore to lower emissions worldwide, all else held equal.
Until recently, the high costs of SPs were deemed to be a major obstacle to solar
adoption. The reduction in prices therefore contributed to promoting solar deployment. However, with the decrease in prices, SPs represent only a small portion of
the total cost of a photovoltaic (PV) system, which is now mainly made of the
costs of installation, marketing, and permitting. Price declines in SPs will no
longer be the main driver of cost reduction of solar PV installations. Therefore, reducing the price of panels further through subsidies or other means will no longer
be a major contributor to solar adoption and further emission reductions. The environmental externality of solar panel subsidies will therefore become harder to
argue.
Also from an environmental point of view, whether it is globally welfare enhancing to produce the majority of SPs in China depends both on their production’s
carbon footprint and the pollution reduction they achieve. A study found that
the carbon footprint of Chinese SPs is twice as high as European SPs and that
the energy use efﬁciency is 30% lower (Yue et al., 2014). Those two facts combined
would suggest it might not be optimal for SPs to be built in China. In addition,
much of the consumption of SPs happens in Europe and the US, which means
there are also shipping emissions costs. A related question would be whether the
US is the optimal place to deploy the SPs and WTs, depending on the amount of
carbon displaced. In 2010, the carbon intensity of the energy sector in China surpassed that of the US, but the US ranked amongst the countries with the highest
carbon intensities (IEA, 2013).
In terms of wind, world prices of WTs declined precipitously after 2008. The
capacity increase in WTs originated in part in China. The Chinese market had
such large excess capacity by 2009 that the Ministry of Land and Resources
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started to deny applications for new WTs manufacturing facilities (Lewis, 2014a).
Since 2009, China has dramatically increased its domestic WTs installation, while
other countries experienced a slow-down. China is now the top country in terms of
new WTs installations (GWEC, 2013).
In terms of welfare, China is a growing player in WT production and the price of
Chinese turbines was half the price of US turbines in 2012. Nonetheless, the six top
Chinese ﬁrms combined still account for less global market share than each of the
world leaders, Vestas or General Electric (Lewis, 2014a). Still, the recent sharp
decline in Chinese WT production costs combined with lower shipping costs
have helped China gain a larger global market share, affecting Europe’s and the
US’s capacity to compete. The Chinese subsidies are most likely responsible for
at least part of the lower production costs. However, the lack of competition in
China might have led to inefﬁciencies in the Chinese wind industry, and Chinese
turbines suffer from reliability issues (Wang et al., 2012), which suggests a negative
effect on both Chinese and global social welfare. The question is whether the positive effect on welfare from lower prices overcomes the negative effect from inefﬁciencies in energy use.
In sum, it appears that in both solar and wind China has global market power
and affects world prices. The subsidies contribute to lowering world prices
through increased supply and competitive cost structures. In turn, this beneﬁts
world consumers, but hurts competing suppliers. The positive effect on consumers
will offset the loss to import-competing producers so the importing country will be
better off overall. Nonetheless, for strategy trade reasons or political economy
reasons, it might still be in the interest of the importing country to respond to
the subsidies. Environmentally, cheaper SPs and WTs could contribute to increased
deployment of clean energies, and therefore to reductions in polluting fossil-fuel
energy sources, a global welfare improvement. However, the subsidies might also
be distorting efﬁcient markets by incentivizing the production of lower-cost but
less energy-efﬁcient SPs and WTs.

3.4 Political-economy considerations regarding the Chinese subsidies to SPs
Besides social welfare considerations, the Chinese subsidy could be motivated by
political-economy reasons. The subsidy under scrutiny could have been given
under political pressure by local Chinese ﬁrms for rent-seeking or political
motives. Many studies ﬁnd that the allocation of subsidies is correlated with the
political inﬂuence of the beneﬁciaries. Grossman and Helpman (1994) developed
one of the foremost models of the inﬂuence of special interests groups on trade
and subsidy policy. The bottom line is that incumbent politicians care about maximizing social welfare but also about ﬁnancial contributions. The second element
will incentivize them to offer trade and subsidy policies to special interest groups,
leading to socially suboptimal outcomes. Obviously, social-welfare considerations
and rent-seeking ones can both be motivating factors for government policy. The
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question how much each factor contributed to this subsidy is not possible to answer
here.
Finally note that, both from a social-welfare point of view and from a politicaleconomy point of view, the discussion on clean energy has been recently linked to
the issue of jobs, ‘green jobs’, and ‘green growth’. However, evidence on whether
renewable energy policies have a positive effect on economic activity in OECD
countries is mixed (Brunel, 2015). On the one hand, renewable energy policies, including subsidies, do not appear to boost domestic innovation in renewable energy
technologies as ﬁrms adopt existing foreign technologies. On the other hand, the
policies and resulting technology adoption do lead to a signiﬁcant increase in domestic manufacturing production (and thus potentially in jobs in the renewable
sector).

3.5 Countervailing duties
CVDs were imposed by the US on a number of products – which include SPs and
WTs – imported from China to offset the impact of alleged subsidies. Here, we
discuss these CVDs’ welfare effects.
Unlike subsidies to address environmental market failures, a CVD increases the
consumer price of SPs and WTs in the US and thus reduces the consumption of
clean energy in the US. US industry associations of ﬁrms that use these goods repeatedly highlighted that the US CVD will indeed hurt the development of domestic
clean energy by making SPs and WTs more expensive (SEIA, 2013).
Another effect of the CVD is to increase the price received by US producers of
these products, which will in turn increase their production. Given that US consumption decreases and US production increases, the import demand of SPs and
WTs by the US will decline. To the extent that the US is a ‘large’ economy in
these markets, the international price of SPs and WTs will decrease. Thus, consumers in the rest of the world will beneﬁt. Countries that are net importers of SPs
and WTs will experience a terms-of-trade improvement, while the opposite is
true for net exporters of SPs and WTs. More importantly, whether world consumption of clean energy will increase and consumption/production of carbon-fuel
energy will decrease depends on the magnitude of the effects on US consumption
vs. ROW consumption.
Since the US is a net importer of SPs and WTs, its terms-of-trade will improve
with the CVD; however, this might not offset the distortions implied by the
CVD – the standard distortions on the consumption and production sides plus
the distortion associated with the local market failure – especially for very high
levels of the CVD rate. In other words, US social welfare might very well decrease.
So the question is: Why would the US government choose to impose CVDs?
There are a number of possible answers to this question. The ﬁrst one is related to
strategic trade-policy considerations, which are relevant if the market considered is
not perfectly competitive. One of the goals of the Chinese subsidies might be to
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dominate the SPs and WTs world markets, which is likely to be a goal of US policy as
well. One of the main results of the strategic trade-policy literature (Brander and
Spencer, 1985) is that an export subsidy imposed by a foreign government (China)
will increase foreign welfare if there is no retaliation by the domestic government.
However, under certain conditions, the optimal response by the domestic (US) government to the Chinese subsidy is indeed a partial CVD (Dixit, 1989). Finally, Collie
(1991) shows that the CVD discourages the export subsidy. We have insufﬁcient evidence to sort through the motivational question here.

3.6 Overall assessment from an economic point of view
Our reading of the literature related to this case is that, while the Chinese subsidy
might be partly motivated by strategic considerations of the Chinese government to
protect and develop its own industry of SPs and WTs, at the same time the Chinese
subsidy is also consistent with the environmental goal of promoting renewable
energy and reducing CO2 emissions in China and abroad. The Chinese subsidy
is probably one of the drivers of the big reduction in world prices of these products,
making it cheaper all over the world to install SPs and WTs. At the same time, the
existing literature views the countervailing duty as mainly a protectionist measure
to help the local (US) SPs and WTs industries, with potentially detrimental effects
from an environmental point of view.
We agree with this point of view. Subsidies to SPs and WTs can indeed address
market failures associated with the carbon-intensive electricity production. More
importantly, since the subsidies were not directly targeted at exports, they did
not reduce Chinese consumption of these goods. There is also evidence that
Chinese prices of SPs and WTs decreased and their installation in China greatly
increased in the last few years, which is consistent with environmental goals.
But in general, how efﬁcient are subsidies in addressing the externality associated
with fossil fuel consumption? The Chinese subsidies can address a market failure
but they may also introduce other distortions. For example, it might be that the reduction in pollution associated with production of Chinese SPs and WTs is smaller
than that of US SPs and WTs. If so, a ‘world’ social-planner would prefer that these
subsidies be allocated to US-based production.
What about the CVD imposed by the US? As in the standard case of a tariff, the
CVD creates distortions, which are likely to more than offset any welfare-enhancing
impact of the CVD. First, consumer prices are going to increase in the US, which will
lead to smaller consumption in the US of SPs and WTs. Is there a terms of trade
rationale for the CVD? The CVD will further decrease the world price of SPs and
WTs, which improves the terms of trade of the US and of any importer of those
goods. In addition, the reduction in the international price of SPs and WTs due to
the CVD will increase ROW consumption of clean energy and reduce ROW pollution. Note, however, that if the US imposed a subsidy, not a CVD, it would still
promote US production of these goods without distorting US consumer prices.
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Does this call for changing the WTO rules on trade remedies against foreign subsidies so that countries, at least in the case of environmental goods, are only able to
impose ‘countervailing’ subsidies as opposed to countervailing duties?
Unfortunately, a complete analysis of this important questions is well outside the
scope of this paper.

4. Conclusions: reconciling the legal and economic perspectives
Is the decision by the AB in this case consistent with our answers to the questions
above? In other words, did the AB make a decision that promotes environmental
goals? The AB decision was not focused on environmental policy or global social
welfare. The decision was based on an analysis of the rules of the SCM
Agreement ‒ so the doctrinal analysis was whether the US’s CVD procedures
were consistent with WTO minimum requirements. The AB decision made it
more difﬁcult for a nation to apply ‘out-of-country’ benchmarks (making it
harder, but not impossible, to impose higher CVDs). If lower (or no CVDs) is
better for the environment, then the AB decision pushes WTO law in this direction,
although only a little bit. The ruling still allows CVDs on environmental goods regardless of a social welfare analysis of whether CVDs would be optimal in each
case. In addition, the SCM Agreement allows WTO members to apply domestic
remedies (such as CVDs) without effective WTO review for four years or more,
which is particularly harmful in an industry that has rapid technological change,
such as the SP and WT industries. Thus, any real advancement in the liberalization
of trade in environmental goods will probably require a negotiated agreement
rather than judicial interpretations of the current WTO Agreements.
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